After assuming the position of prime minister in October 2021, Fumio Kishida presented a foreign policy guideline based on relations of trust in his policy speech. His administration will implement a foreign policy that adheres to three principles: unwaveringly defend universal values including freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; safeguard Japan’s peace and stability and strive to address global challenges. In regard to relations between China and Japan, Kishida emphasizes the importance of establishing a stable relationship, which is vital for the two countries, the region and the international community. Nevertheless, Japan will say to China the things that need to be said and strongly urge China to act responsibly. Japan will engage in dialogues with China and cooperate with each other in addressing issues they share in common.
Kishida is a member of the Kochikai faction of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Co-founder of the faction Hayato Ikeda advocated the expansion of trade between Japan and China through people-to-people exchanges based on the principle of separating politics and economy when he was the prime minister. As a result, China initially maintained a friendly attitude toward Kishida, hoping to improve the soured bilateral relations during the Abe Shinzo administration. Xi Jinping held a phone conversation with Kishida soon after the latter took office. The two sides agreed to take the opportunity of the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan to develop constructive and stable bilateral relations.
However, relations between Japan and China have deteriorated since 2022. China has moved closer to Russia after the eruption of the Russia-Ukraine war. China launched large-scale exercises around the Taiwan Strait to protest the then U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. China has repeatedly urged or even warned Japan not to interfere in Taiwan-related issues. Japan, on the other hand, strongly protests the threat to its security posed by China’s military exercises. Japan also restrains China in the semiconductor supply chain. As a result, people in Japan and China have persistently held negative views about each other. For example, according to the 18th Japan-China Joint Public Opinion Poll (November 2022), 87.3% Japanese respondents said that their impression of China was poor or relatively poor, while 62.6% Chinese respondents expressed the same negative views about Japan.
The main reason behind the transformation of the Kishida administration’s China policy is that there is a huge change in Japan’s strategic focus. As the concept of defending economic security and related policies take shape, the Kishida administration no longer adheres to the past concept in terms of Japan’s relations with China because technological development, economic and trade relations and the semiconductor conductor supply chain involve political as well as economic issues. This trend prompts Japan to simultaneously consider the political and economic aspects of its relations with China instead of separating politics and economy. Relations between Taiwan and Japan also evolve from focusing on administrative issues to strategic ones and are no longer characterized by “cold politics and hot economy.”
It is worth mentioning that the Kishida administration published Japan’s second National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS, previously named National Defense Program Guidelines) and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP, previously named Medium Term Defense Program) in December 2022 against the aforementioned background. Besides emphasizing that China has become the greatest strategic challenge for Japan and the international community in its NSS, Japan also devotes many pages in its NDS to changes in the security environment centering on China’s military activities. Japan will coordinate and cooperate with the U.S. concerning the three conditions for the use of force (when there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; when there are no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense and when the use of armed force is confined to be the minimum necessary level. Japan also presents the idea of building counterstrike capabilities.
In the foreseeable future, relations between China and Japan will continue to follow a path that tries to break away from separating politics and economy. This means that Japan needs to further coordinate political and economic resources as well as deliberates on and formulates its own China strategy. Moreover, with the recognition of the three conditions for the use of force and that any contingency for Taiwan is a contingency for Japan, relations between Taiwan and Japan continue to adjust and change. Taiwan has gradually become Japan’s de-facto strategic partner beyond its original role as a very important friend.
（Shih-hui Li, Professor of the College of International Affairs at National Chengchi University）
(Translated to English by Cindy Li)
