Commentary on the China-Russia Northern/Interaction-2023 Military Exercise

Release Date : 2023-07-27

1. Overview of the Exercise  

    On June 9, 2023, Liu Zhenli, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, and Valery Gerasimov, First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, confirmed in a video call that the Russian military would be participating in the Northern/Interaction-2023 exercise hosted by the Northern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA.) The naval vessels of the two sides began to mobilize on July 15, arrived at the central Sea of Japan on July 18, and set up the joint command of the exercise.

1-1. Troop strength of both sides for the exercise

1-1-1. People’s Liberation Army

1-1-1-1. Navy

From the Northern Theater Command: Type 052D destroyers Guiyang (pennant number: 119) and Qiqihar (121), Type 054A frigates Zaozhuang (542) and Rizhao (598), Type 903 replenishment oiler Taihu (889), and four ship-borne helicopters. Judging from the exercise subjects, there should be submarines accompanying the ship.

1-1-1-2. Air Force

1-1-1-2-1. From the Central Theater Command: Y-20 military transport aircraft (37th Regiment of the 13th Transportation Aircraft Division, stationed in Kaifeng City, Henan Province).

1-1-1-2-2. From the Northern Theater Command: about 20 KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, J-16 fighter aircraft, and Z-20 helicopters.

1-1-2. Russian Army

1-1-2-1. Pacific Fleet

Two large anti-submarine ship: Admiral Tributs (564) and Admiral Panteleyev (548,) Project 20385 corvette Gremyashchiy (337), and Project 20380 corvette Aldar Tsydenzhapov (339), as well as the Ka-27 anti-submarine helicopters.

1-1-2-2. Pacific Fleet Air Force

It is composed of more than 10 aircraft, including the Il-38 anti-submarine patrol aircraft and Su-30SM fighter aircraft.

1-2. Time of the Exercise: July 20-23, 2023

1-3. Location of the Exercise: Central Sea of Japan.

1-4. Exercise Command

    The joint command is set up on the Type 052D destroyer Qiqihar (flagship), under which there is a maritime operations command group, and an air operations command group, with a mix of Chinese and Russian staff in each group.

1-5. Exercise Command

    The exercise commander is Rear Admiral Qiu Wensheng (Deputy Commander of the Naval Forces of the Northern Theater Command), and the deputy exercise commander is Rear Admiral Valery Kazakov (Commander of the Pacific Fleet’s Primorsky Flotilla.)

1-6. Exercise Themes

Safeguarding the safety of strategic maritime passage.

1-7. Exercise Subjects

Air-sea escort, deterrence and repulsion, anchorage defense, simulated naval battle, and enemy aircraft shooting.

2. Characterization of the exercise

2-1. Legal agreements on the mutual landing and transfer of military aircraft between the two sides.

On July 15, 2023, the first batch of the PLA Air Force to participate in Northern/Interaction-2023 flew to the Vladivostok International Airport in Russia aboard a Y-20, which was responsible for the advance operation of logistic support for the participating units. Looking back at the China-Russia Joint Aerial Strategic Patrol, on November 30, 2022, the Chinese H-6K Bomber landed at the Vladivostok Airport in the 5th Patrol, while the Russian Tu-95 landed in Hangzhou, and on June 6, 2023, the Russian Tu-95 landed in Nanjing in the 6th Patrol. Judging from the mutual landings of China and Russia at their respective airports, the first thing needed to be resolved is not the problem of C3 (Command, Control and Communications), maintenance of combat power, or logistical support, but the legal issue. When a foreign military aircraft lands at a foreign airport with weapons on board, relevant legal agreements documents should have been approved beforehand. In other words, the mutual landing of Chinese and Russian military aircraft at each other’s airports must be carried out under the auspices of the law. When the air force of Northern Theater Command flew the J-16s and KJ-500s from their home airports to the Vladivostok airport, and then took off together with the Russian military planes at the beginning of the exercise, shows an enhanced mutual trust and cooperation between the two sides.

2-2. The Russian army was integrated into the PLA command system for the first time.

Rear Admiral Qiu Wensheng, and Rear Admiral Valery Kazakov are at the helm of the Joint Command. The Joint Command consists of officers and non-commissioned officers from both sides, and is under the command and control of the PLA. This mode of command is the first of its kind since the inception of joint military exercises in 2012. In the past, the Chinese and Russian sides commanded their respective forces. This time, the joint command has adopted a joint structure for organization, planning, deployment, command, operation and protection, with the Chinese military in direct command of the Russians. This shows the deepened military cooperation and mutual trust between the two sides.

2-3. Improved Functions of the Dedicated Command Information System

During the Western/Interaction-2021 exercise, Chinese media reported that the Chinese had specially developed a dedicated China-Russia command and information system to facilitate the joint military exercises, linking to the various sub-centers, and connected to the command posts of the combat groups, as well as reaching the end of the soldier platforms of the two militaries. As seen in the Western/Interaction-2021, Naval Interaction-2022, and Northern/Interaction-2023 exercises, this dedicated command information system not only serves the army, but also the navy and the air force. It has already been integrated and harmonized, which is a further step forward in their joint warfare and coordination capabilities. In other words, the China-Russia joint command and communication system has evolved from the era of radio to that of data link.

2-4. The PLA replenishment oilers supported the participating naval vessels.

For the Northern/Interaction-2023 exercise, 9 surface vessels from the both sides participated. The Chinese fleet included the Type 903 Replenishment Oiler Taihu (889), while the Russian fleet did not include any oiler, which means that the Russian army will rely on the Taihu during the military exercise. In other words, the two militaries have built up a joint supply capability and an integrated logistic system to support each other with the necessary supplies to maintain their operational capability.

2-5. Theater commands of the PLA take turns in hosting Chinese-Russian military exercises.

The Western/Interaction-2021, and the Northern/Interaction-2023 exercises were conducted by the Western and Northern Theater Commands respectively. As such, future joint exercises will likely be hosted by the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands, in a targeted and effective manner to enhance their preparedness for battle. This arrangement is probably done to prepare and deepen each theater command’s ability to conduct joint operations.

2-6. China and Russia Jointly Countering the Indo-Pacific Strategy

On June 1, 2023, Russia opened the port of Vladivostok to China as a transshipment port for cross-border transportation of domestic trade goods, indicating that the two sides are using economic and trade activities to strengthen their confrontation with the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy. The theme of the Northern/Interaction-2023 exercise is “safeguarding the safety of strategic maritime passage.” Although it is declared that the exercise will not target a third country, the chosen exercise area in central Sea of Japan, is a deliberate act as a warning to the opponent. Russia is caught in a war with Ukraine, while the Chinese Communist Party is being cornered by the US on all fronts: technological, economic, trade, and military. With the Northern/Interaction-2023 exercise, China and Russia wish to demonstrate their countering ability in the Sea of Japan, which will in turn, restrain Japan’s role and function in the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

 (Yang Tai-yuan, Contract Research Fellow, Institute of Chinese Communist Studies)

(Translated to English by Chen Cheng-Yi)