(Kuo Jui-hua, Special Researcher, Prospect & Exploration Monthly)
The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (hereinafter referred to as the 20th Third Plenary Session) was held in Beijing from July 15 to 18, 2024. On behalf of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, General Secretary of the Central Committee, Xi Jinping, delivered a work report to the Plenary Session, deliberated and adopted the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on Further Deepening Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernization (hereinafter referred to as the Resolution). At the end of the Plenary Session, the official Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (hereinafter referred to as the Communique) was released. Starting from the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, except for the 19th which was held in February, the other Third Plenary Sessions were usually held between September to December of the year after the Party Congress. Now, the 20th Third Plenary Session was held in July this year, which was 20 months after the Party Congress, making it the longest-delayed Third Plenary Session after the China’s reform and opening up. The most important agenda of this meeting is to deliberate on the draft of the Resolution and personnel matters. As the both the Resolution and Xi Jinping’s Explanation are to be announced at a later date, this article will only focus on the Communique.
The Communique pointed out that the overall goal of this reform is to continue to improve and develop the socialist system with Chinese characteristics and to modernize the national governance system and its capabilities. The reform is set to be completed by the 80th anniversary of the founding of the CPC in 2029. The time frame is obviously very tight as the CPC attempts to accomplish it in five years, which also suggests that Xi Jinping will continue to serve as General Secretary of the Central Committee at the 21st Party Congress in 2027.
It can be seen from the Communique that the Resolution has 14 major reform fields, including: building a high-standard socialist market economy, promoting high-quality economic development, supporting all-around innovation, improving macroeconomic governance, promoting integrated urban-rural development, pursuing high-standard opening up, advancing whole-process people’s democracy, promoting socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics, deepening reform in the cultural sector, ensuring and improving the people’s wellbeing, deepening reform in ecological conservation, modernizing China’s national security system and capacity, deepening national defense and military reform, improving the party’s leadership in promoting Chinese-style modernization. It shows that the scope of the Resolution covers economic, political, social, cultural, ecological, national security, national defense and other fields, and particularly emphasizes the core role of the party’s leadership in the reform process.
Comparing the reforms mentioned in the Communiques of the 20th Third Plenary Session and that of the 18th Third Plenary Session in 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the last time), there are similarities: both emphasized the deepening of the reform in an all-round way, and mentioned improving the economic system, promoting the construction of democracy and political development, enhancing the rule of law, deepening cultural sector reform, promoting ecological conservation, and deepening the reform of the national defense and the armed forces. They also highlight the importance of Party leadership in the reform process. Differences: In terms of changes in wording and concepts, words such as “accelerate” and “deepen” were used the last time, while this time, the words “sound” and “perfect” were used more often, reflecting on the different stages of the reform process. As for economic reform, improving the modern market system and transforming government functions was emphasized the last time, and this time, it emphasizes high-quality development and innovation-driven. Regarding urban and rural development, last time was about the integration of urban and rural development, while this time it is the integrated development of urban and rural areas, showing the evolution of the concept. Regarding the degree of openness, last time it was proposed to construct a new open economic system, but this time it emphasizes a high level of external openness and a higher goal of openness. Regarding democratic politics, last time it was mentioned that the construction of a socialist democratic political system would be strengthened, while this time it is proposed to improve the system of people’s democracy in the whole process, showing the development of Xi’s concept of democracy. On social governance, last time it was proposed to innovate the social governance system, while this time it is directly proposed to modernize the national security system and capacity, reflecting the increased importance attached to security issues. These differences reflect the changes in China’s development over the past decade and the strategic adjustments it has made in the face of the new internal and external situation; the current reform and deployment of reforms focuses more on high-quality development, innovation-driven, all-round openness, and national security.
After the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s economic recovery has been weaker than expected, with foreign companies withdrawing their investments and moving out of China, private enterprises experiencing difficulties in their operations and entrepreneurs’ confidence being low, and many families experiencing a decrease in their personal income. Therefore, before the meeting, it was expected that the Resolution would propose solutions to the economic difficulties of China in recent years. Obviously, the abovementioned reform is mainly a top-level design at the macro level, focusing on long-term and comprehensive reforms rather than short-term solutions to current economic problems, reflecting Xi’s strategic thinking, which tends to plan long-term development fundamentally and systematically, rather than focusing only on current economic stimulus measures.
Regarding personnel matters, the Communique stated that the resignation of Qin Gang was approved, and he was dismissed from his duties as a member of the Central Committee. The fact that Qin’s party membership was retained indicates that he was not involved in a political discipline issue, but was removed from his post due to personal misconduct. On the other hand, Li Shangfu, former member of the Central Military Commission and Minister of National Defense, Li Yuchao, former commander of the Rocket Force, and Sun Jinming, former chief of staff of the Rocket Force, were expelled from the party for serious violations of discipline and law. Surprisingly, Dong Jun was not added as a member of the Central Military Commission, thus continuing to serve as the Minister of National Defense, with no real power. In addition, three Central Committee members were replaced by Ding Xiangqun, Yu Lijun and Yu Jihong, who ranked 1st, 3rd and 4th in the list of Central Committee alternates, while Ding Xingnong, who ranked 2nd in the list, was skipped over. As he used to be the director of the Political Department of the General Armament Department of the Central Military Commission, it inevitably triggered people’s speculations.
（Translated to English by Chen Cheng-Yi）
