Differences between the Three Military Exercises of the People’s Liberation Army Encircling Taiwan

Release Date : 2024-05-27

(Yang Tai-yuan, Contract Research Fellow, Institute of Chinese Communist Studies)

On May 23, 2024, the Nanjing branch of Xinhua News Agency reported, “Eastern Theater Command spokesperson Colonel Li Xihai announced that from May 23 to 24, the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will mobilize the troops of Army, Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force to carry out the “Joint Sword-2024A” military exercise around Taiwan. The exercise will focus on joint air and sea combat readiness patrols, joint seizure of battlefield control, joint precision hitting of key targets, and other subjects, as well as warships approaching the periphery of Taiwan for war patrols, and integrated mobilization inside and outside the island chain to test the joint combat capability of the troops in the theater command.” At the same time, it was also announced that “starting at 7:45am on May 23, the Eastern Theater Command will launch joint training in the Taiwan Strait, the northern, southern and eastern parts of the island, and the vicinity of Kinmen, and Mazu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin Islands.” Compared to the “Joint Military Operation against Taiwan” in 2022 and the “Combat Readiness Patrol and Joint Sword Exercise” in 2023, this military exercise is significantly different, and the differences are listed as below:

I. Name change

In 2022, PLA’s “Encircling Taiwan Exercise” was named “Joint Military Operation against Taiwan”; in 2023, it was named “Combat Readiness Patrol and Joint Sword Exercise”; and this time it was named “Joint Sword-2024A Exercise.” This shows that the PLA has already differentiated military exercises around Taiwan into the “combat readiness patrol” for regular fleet activities and the “law enforcement patrol” for the coast guard, while military exercise will be codenamed as “Joint Sword.” According to the PLA rules for naming military exercises, “Joint Sword” is the theme, “2024” is the year, and “A” is the phase (or session) of the exercise. This shows that the PLA’s military exercises around Taiwan have become routine, serialized, and to be held annually, while the number of military exercises each year will depend on changes in the situation and needs, and will no longer be limited to one exercise per year.

II. First participation of the Coast Guard

In the “Joint Sword-2024A Exercise”, the participating troops of the Eastern Theatre Command include the Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and the Coast Guard, and nine exercise areas were being designated. During the exercise, the Coast Guard vessels entered the prohibited and restricted sea areas of the outer islands, and the its 2304 fleet (4 vessels) launched a comprehensive law enforcement exercise in the sea area east of the island of Taiwan, focusing on training in the subjects of verification and identification, warning and eviction, etc., to test the ability of joint cruising and emergency response. During the exercise, the vessels performed actions such as radar detection and search, approaching for evidence, verbal warnings and spraying water cannons to intercept, as well as boarding, controlling and seizing the target vessels through law enforcement officers. The exercise shows that China wish to demonstrate its sovereignty through the law enforcement actions of the Coast Guard vessels, and implies that the they may board and seize vessels in the outer islands and the waters around Taiwan in the future, disrupting the supply of the Taiwan army to the outer islands, and highlight China’s sovereignty over the enforcement of the law.

III. The scope of the military exercise includes the outer islands and off-shore islands for the first time.

The “Joint Military Operation Against Taiwan” and the “Combat Readiness Patrol and Joint Sword Exercise” mainly focused on the sea and airspace around Taiwan, but the “Joint Sword-2024A Exercise” for the first time incorporates the vicinity of Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin Islands, which not only highlights China’s sovereignty, but also trains the tactics of “encircling to fight reinforcements”.

IV. Increase in audio-visual threats

During Exercise “Combat Readiness Patrol and Joint Sword”, the PLA released a video of its firing simulation. During “Joint Sword-2024A Exercise,” the Political Work Department of the Eastern Theater Command produced various TikTok videos with complete and easy-to-understand contents. In other words, the TikTok videos were mainly targeted at Taiwanese young people in an attempt to influence (or subconsciously) their perception of war, which in turn aroused their fear of war.

V. Increased confidentiality

The 2022 “Joint Military Operation against Taiwan” was announced on August 2, and began on August 4. The 2023 “Combat Readiness Patrol and Joint Sword” was announced on April 6, and then conducted from April 8 to 10. The “Joint Sword-2024A Exercise” was announced and commenced by the Eastern Theater Command at the same time, indicating that the said Command has already had various scenarios or plans for military exercises involving Taiwan. After President Lai Ching-te’s inaugural speech on May 20, China’s Central Military Commission immediately approved the exercise plan, and the troops were prepared and deployed to the exercise area. This shows that the PLA has stepped up its confidentiality and deception, so that the outside world has no idea of what is going on, which is why there was no warning beforehand, and the drills were announced and started immediately.

In summary, the PLA “Joint Sword-2024A Exercise” only lasted for 2 days. As the weather was not favorable, the exercise seemed to be done in a haste and did not seem to have affected the daily life of the Taiwanese people, which is probably the “boiling frog” effect that China anticipates. The name of the military exercise seems to indicate that it is only the first in a series of military exercises against Taiwan this year, and there should be several more to come. While the PLA military exercises were foreseen by the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense, it seems that the public was not aware of them. This was also the case when the PLA “Strategic Support Forces” were abolished and reorganized into three other types of military forces, and it was not until the handover ceremony of the “Information Support Forces” was it known to the public. In the face of the China’s enhanced confidentiality, while the Taiwanese army can grasp and track the movements of the PLA troops through the “joint intelligence surveillance,” it has no knowledge of the contents of the relevant plans. In the face of this dilemma, it is advisable for our national security units and the Ministry of National Defense to carefully consider the necessity of expanding and strengthening our intelligence gathering on the China, so as to grasp all kinds of early warning intelligence and to ensure the security of the country.

Translated to English by Chen Cheng-Yi