(Chang Ching, Research Fellow, Society for Strategic Studies R.O.C.)
The “Joint Sword-2024A” exercise held by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around the Taiwan Strait from May 23rd to 24th has come to an end as scheduled in the press release by the Eastern Theater Command. Although there are still PLA aircraft and vessels in the sea and airspace around the Taiwan Straits, the number of troops has decreased significantly. Not to mention the two sides have also “ceased fire” after trading words with each other during the exercise. This is a confirmation that the “Joint Sword-2024A” exercise has indeed come to an end.
Notwithstanding the above, several objective facts are to be noted. First, the Chinese competent maritime authority did not designate any military exercise area and issued any Notice to Mariners to prohibit vessels from entering the relevant waters. The Chinese civil aviation authority also did not issue any Notice to Airmen to prohibit civil aircraft from entering the airspace of the exercise.
Furthermore, the Eastern Theater Command, which is responsible for the exercise, did not release detailed latitude and longitude coordinates for any of the exercise areas or issue any firing notices, and did not restrict any sea and air transportation and shipping activities in the exercise areas surrounding the Taiwan main island or its outer islands. Therefore, it is still unknown as to where the boundaries of the sea and airspace covered by the exercise are. However, it is also indisputable that there had been no interference with the relevant civil maritime transportation and navigation, fishermen’s operations, or civil aviation flights.
It is, therefore, quite curious whether there are any political connotations to the PLA “Joint Sword-2024A” exercise for not following its usual practice or the standard operating procedures, and the PLA not issuing any standard notice. In particular, the five exercise areas around Taiwan and Penghu appear to be bordering the outer edges of the ROC territorial sea baselines. Since the PLA only released schematic maps without precise coordinates, it is difficult to prove whether this is a coincidence or an unspoken tacit understanding between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
While Taiwan have once publicly declared that 24 nautical miles is the last red line should PLA aircrafts continue to approach Taiwan, never is it explicitly stated to be counted from the coastline or the territorial sea baseline. However, from the positions shown on the PLA schematic map of the exercise area, it is obviously signaling some kind of political message that cannot be openly disclosed. It sure is something worth pondering.
The reason for not releasing the detailed coordinates is that if the aforesaid exercise area is indeed bordering the outer edge of the ROC territorial sea baselines, then it could be interpreted as indirectly recognizing Taiwan’s territorial sea baseline, which is of great political significance. During the Ma Ying-jeou administration, both sides did not recognize each other’s sovereignty, but at the same time did not deny each other’s right to rule, and maintained a framework of interaction under the premise of the “1992 Consensus” in order to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Even though PLA’s “Joint Sword-2024A” exercise around Taiwan’s main island and Penghu borders its outer edge and the Eastern Theater Command held the exercise accordingly, Beijing chose not to point it out and showed their cards. This is the subtlety in interpreting cross-strait relations.
Many military observers and political commentators have noted the aforementioned lack of navigational warnings and flight safety notifications, and understood that the navigation between the outer islands and the main island were not affected. However, they did not notice that all the official messages issued did not mention terms such as “blockade” or “siege of the Taiwan Straits.” Only some laymen commentators of the PLA have mentioned the word “blockade” in their media analysis of the exercise areas, without knowing that its usage means war, and it is obvious that such uninformed statements do not represent the official position.
Last but not least, why did the exercise call it quits after only two days? It might be a matter of opinion whether the May 27th China–Japan–South Korea trilateral summit in Seoul was a key factor in limiting the duration of the exercise.
（Translated to English by Chen Cheng-Yi）
