（Tung-Chieh Tsai, Distinguished Professor of the Graduate Institute of International Politics at National Chung-Hsing University）
From the 18th Party Congress in 2012 to the 19th Party Congress in 2017, China’s assessment of its environment showed obvious consistency as it claimed that “both China and the world are in the midst of profound and complex changes. China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity for development." In fact, this has also been Beijing’s constant thinking and perspective since the new century. What different is that the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras focused on passive response, while Xi Jinping may attach more importance to active construction. For example, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered a speech on exploring the path of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics at the World Peace Forum at Tsinghua University in 2013. It is followed by formally confirming the guiding role of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics at the Central Conference on Work Related to Foreign Affairs in 2014. In the same year, Wang Yi also coined two new terms for Chinese diplomacy: host diplomacy and pinpoint diplomacy. The former emphasizes China’s center position and focuses on organizing four to five international conferences or events in China every year. The latter underscores its characteristic of precise response.
According to China's official statements, the main manifestation of the so-called pinpoint diplomacy is one country in one trip. Compared to the fact that other heads of state usually visit an average of three to four countries at a time, Xi only visits one country with this pinpoint diplomacy. For example, Xi went to Russia to attend the Sochi Winter Olympics and visited South Korea and Mongolia on separate trips in 2014. He visited the United Kingdom in 2015, attended the Russian Eastern Economic Forum in 2018, went to North Korea in 2019 and visited Myanmar in 2020. Especially in the wake of COVID-19, Xi visited Thailand to attend the APEC summit and went to Saudi Arabia to attend the first China-Arab States Summit in 2022. He travelled to Russia, attended the BRICS summit in South Africa, paid a state visit to the United States to attend the APEC summit and visited Vietnam in 2023. To date, there have been twelve such trips. There are signs that this pinpoint diplomacy seems to become the norm.
Xi's visit to three European countries, including France, Serbia and Hungary, in May 2024, seems to be different from the so-called pinpoint diplomacy. However, there is still room for observation from the perspective of precise response as it is the essence of the diplomatic approach. The so-called precise response refers to key reactions to changes in current international structure and situation. For example, it seems to become regular that Xi attends the APEC meeting as he showed up at the meetings in 2022 and 2023. However, the real highlight of Xi’s presence was a summit between the United States and China on the sideline of the meetings. Amid confrontational and tense relations between the two countries, how to maintain “fighting without breaking” through high-level in-person communication is indeed critical to each other’s core interests. Moreover, Xi’s attending a summit in Saudi Arabia in 2022 was obviously a move to advance when the enemy retreats as the United States withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021. In a move with greater strategic implications, China pulled Saudi Arabia into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) soon after it brokered the resumption of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.
Wars broke out in Ukraine in February 2022 and in Gaza in October 2023. The trajectory of the two major conflicts remains unpredictable. There is a possibility of forming a powder keg in the Middle East in the future due to the geographical proximity of the two wars. Europe will then bear the brunt. However, the fact that Washington remains ambiguous about possible solutions is raising doubts among allies. For example, French President Emmanuel Macron’s comments that Europe should not go into conflict with China over Taiwan and should not be a follower of the United States after his visit to China in April 2023 certainly caused controversy. However, France has not changed its mind so far. Serbia and Hungary have long been friendly with Beijing. Hungary especially has demonstrated its key veto position in the EU several times.
In other words, amid these troubled times, whether to win over France and sow doubts about the United States in the EU, consolidate relations with Central and Eastern European countries or even deepen differences within the EU, Xi’s visit is not only in line with current situation and can kill multiple birds with one stone but also conform to the characteristic of pinpointing. Subsequent development is worth continued observation.
（Excerpt translated to English by Cindy Li）
