（Huang Yi-wei, Research Fellow, Association of Strategic Foresight）
Xi Jinping has attached great importance to national security issues since he became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP.) In 2014, Xi put forward “Overall National Security Outlook” for the first time; in 2015 saw the implementation of the National Security Law, and the designation of April 15 as the nationwide National Security Education Day; in 2020 saw the official approval of Beijing Normal University, Jilin University, and Nanjing University to confer doctoral degrees in national security; in 2021 saw the establishment of the Research Center for Overall National Security; and in April 2022 saw the establishment of the Department of National Security at Peking University. In addition, Xi Jinping’s recent reintroduction of Mao Zedong’s “Fengqiao Experience”, and his continued promotion of “grid-style social management” in China, which aims to strengthen the control of social and grassroots officials through people’s mutual monitoring and reporting, are all indications of his anxiety over “security” issues.
April 15, 2024 marked the 9th National Security Education Day in China, the Ministry of State Security published via video the “Top 10 Cases of Counterespionage” and the “Top 10 Cases of Citizen’s Reporting.” The former includes the cases of Henley Lee and Michael Kovrig, while the latter includes cases such as civilian’s report of suspicious personnel taking pictures of military targets and Jiangsu fisherman’s capture of a surveillance device on the sea. The Ministry of State Security also emphasized that “every person is a guardian of national security” and encouraged all citizens to catch spies and “build a steel wall to safeguard national security.”
As early as April 2017, the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau implemented the “Measures for Rewarding Citizens for Reporting Spy Acts”. According to the said Measures, Chinese citizens who report on possible espionage activities and contribute to in their crackdown can be rewarded up to 500,000 yuan (RMB, the same below), while false accusations against others will also be subject to legal sanctions. There are three ways to report espionage: first, by calling the national security authorities; second, by sending a letter to the national security authorities; and third, by going directly to the national security authorities. After reporting, the information will be evaluated based on its use and effect, and will be rewarded at four levels, with bonuses of 100,000 to 500,000 yuan, 50,000 to 100,000 yuan, and 10,000 to 50,000 yuan, respectively. In 2018, the Municipal Bureau released the result of its first year implementation, receiving nearly 5,000 reports from various sectors through calling the “12339” telephone hotline and mail. Cases included civilians entrusted with the task of inciting scientific researchers to defect and providing scientific and technological intelligence to foreign countries; foreign nationals using green cards and money to entice researchers to provide information on classified scientific research projects; and foreign nationals carrying photographic equipment took chartered cars to take pictures around military control zones in China and were reported by the chauffeurs. Since then, Chinese netizens have often referred to Internet users whose speech does not conform to the official mainstream ideology as “walking 500,000”, implying that they are spies.
Based on the aforementioned Measures, China later expanded the scope of the public reporting mechanism to the whole country, and the Ministry of National Security issued and enforced the “Measures for Rewarding Citizens for Reporting Acts Endangering National Security” in June 2022. According to the said Measures, citizens may report through the “12339” telephone hotline, online platforms, by mail or in person, and are encouraged to report with name, which must involve specific people and things. Upon successful reporting, national security agencies will issue moral (award certificate) or material incentives (bonus) depending on the individual cases. The bonus will be categorized into four levels according to the degree of contribution, with the lowest being less than 10,000 yuan and the highest being more than 100,000 yuan. In addition, when two or more persons provide the same information, the first informant will be rewarded, while the other informants will be given “discretionary rewards”.
In 2014, China implemented the Counterespionage Law, which was significantly revised in 2023. The new Counterespionage Law expands the original 44 articles to 71 articles, defines “espionage” more broadly, recognizes a wider scope and retroactive effect, and offers rewards of more than 100,000 yuan to those who report espionage. China hopes that these laws and reporting measures will “serve as a strong deterrent to the arrogant foreign espionage and intelligence agencies,” but at the same time, it also highlighted the CCP’s extreme anxiety about “security” and “maintaining stability.” In addition, encouraging public reporting will lead to social division and distrust among people. A disunited society might help the CCP’s manipulation and high-handed rule in the short term, but in the long run, the result will impact on economic development and social stability, and eventually backfire on the CCP’s ruling foundation.
Based on the above cases, coupled with the current strained cross-strait relations and some serious anti-Taiwan sentiment among the Chinese public, Taiwanese people visiting China may be prone to being reported by Chinese civilians and drivers for certain behaviors or remarks made when taking public transportation, and taxis. The recently published cases showed that the scope of “security” in China has expanded from traditional military and technological theft to the theft of biological samples. In addition, due to the lack of clear elements for what constitute a “security” case, and various political considerations, Taiwanese people visiting China might be liable to a lot of unnecessary harassment. China can also utilize the many cases of “suspected espionage” as a bargaining chip to manipulate cross-strait or international relations, which certainly deserves our government’s attention.
（Translated to English by Chen Cheng-Yi）
