（ Tzou Wen-Feng , Assistant Professor of the Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies at National Defense University）
Hong Kong's South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported on March 28 that Cai Qi, member of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Politburo Standing Committee and secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, has taken over as the head of the Communist Party’s Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission. People familiar with the matter say that Cai already led the commission in the first half of last year.
As Xi Jinping enters his third term as the CPC General Secretary, he already grabs the power to make personnel decisions and has the final say on party affairs, political lines and policies. Cai’s new position may reflect that Xi is delegating some of his responsibilities to his close aides to reduce his burden and increase efficiency. What kind of impact will such a development have on the power structure of the CPC, where there are no factions to challenge Xi? Cai, who has always been loyal to implement Xi's will, is taking over the Cyberspace Affairs Commission. What changes will it bring to China's cybersecurity management?
During his first ten years in power, Xi implemented a series of hardline policies to combat corruption and carry out party governance and military structural reform. He has successively purged long-standing political factions within the CPC, leaving no party, political, military or social force that can challenge his regime. In fact, since China’s 2018 constitutional amendment that repeals the term limit for the president, whether Xi would be re-elected as the general secretary of the CPC was no longer an issue at the 20th Party Congress. Instead, the issue that mattered was how Xi would distribute power within the party.
As a result, under Xi’s rule, the gradual formation of new powerful factions loyal to the top leader will be an inevitable development. Xi prefers to appoint former colleagues and subordinates to important positions and prioritizes loyalty. But he also uses technocrats. It is widely believed that the roots of two emerging forces can be traced back to Xi’s colleagues from his early days. They can be roughly divided into the "Zhejiang faction" led by Premier Li Qiang and the "Fujian faction" represented by Cai.
Li is supposedly China’s second most powerful leader after the 20th Party Congress. Nevertheless, Cai has been promoted at a pace rarely seen before, proving that he has Xi’s deep trust. Cai was transferred from the post of the vice governor of Zhejiang Province to the executive deputy director of the office of the newly established Central National Security Commission in April 2015. He was subsequently transferred to the deputy secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee and acting mayor of Beijing in October 2016. Within a short time, he became the Beijing Party Secretary in May 2017. He was elected as a member of the Poltiburo at the First Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee and was re-elected as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, in charge of party building, organization, propaganda and ideology, at the First Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee.
Cai succeeded Ding Xuexiang as the director of the General Office of the Central Committee in March 2023. It marks the first time since China’s reform and opening up that a member of the Politburo Standing Committee concurrently holds the position. In May of the same year, Cai attended the first meeting of the National Security Commission under the 20th Central Committee and served as vice chairman with Li Qiang and Zhao Leji, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. According to Japanese media’s analysis in January, the floods in Hebei at the end of last July at one time threatened the Xiongan New Area. Contrasted to Li’s inability to find a solution, Cai, relying on his experience in the National Security Commission and local governments, decided to break the levees and diverted flood water to rivers near Zhuozhou. Although Zhuozhou was hit by serious flooding, Xiongan was successfully saved. And Xi was only accompanied by Cai when he inspected post-disaster reconstruction work. Since then, the power of Cai and Li appeared to be reversed. It is even possible that Cai has become more powerful than Li.
But so far there is no sign that Li's position is unstable. The premier of the State Council shoulders great responsibilities and is subject to close observation. If Xi has doubts about him, he would already have taken actions. In addition, Cai is 68 years old and Li, 64. They play different roles from the beginning. Xi may intend to let them compete with each other to maintain a balance of power and let them perform their respective duties while coordinating with each other. Moreover, before Xi signals his intent to step down, blatant power struggle within the CPC is unlikely.
When he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee and head of the Organization Department in 2011, Cai announced that he had opened his personal Weibo. By the time when he closed his account before transferring to the central government in 2014, his followers exceeded 10 million. Cai was then one of the highest-ranking CPC officials who used Weibo, showing that he had a certain understanding of China's Internet ecosystem. But judging from the fact that Cai stops at nothing to resolutely implement Xi's directives such as evicting the low-end population and rectifying hidden security dangers, the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission may adopt stricter management and control measures when formulating cyberspace development strategy and enhancing security support capability under his leadership. The commission will be serve a leading role in maintaining stability.
More importantly, there is still no complete succession echelon in the CPC or even Xi’s “crown prince." This may be Xi’s tactic to ensure the loyalty of his aides. A look at what shake the foundation of authoritarian regimes shows that power succession is always a key factor. Change in power within the CPC deserves continuous attention.
（Excerpt translated to English by Cindy Li）
