On March 13, 2024, China Military Online reported that ‘Major General Zhang Baoqun, deputy director of the Office for International Military Cooperation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), led a delegation to visit Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Nepal from March 4 to 13, and held talks with the defense authorities of the three countries on their military cooperation and regional security issues. On March 5, China and Maldives signed an agreement on China’s provision of military assistance gratis to Maldives. On March 7, the delegation visited the Sri Lankan Navy Headquarters and met with the Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Priyantha Perera, as well as the Navy Chief of Staff, and the Director Generals in Engineering, Operations, Training, and Electrical and Electronic Engineering. On March 10, the delegation called on the Nepalese Chief of the Army Staff, General Prabhu Ram Sharma to discuss about the military relations, military procurement and other issues between the two countries. The delegation reached an agreement with the Nepalese side on the procurement of a Chinese armoured personnel carrier, the resumption of the joint military exercise, and the installation of an ammunition plant. The Nepalese Army will send a group of officers to China for training, or China will send military advisers and instructors to assist Nepal in the modernization of its Army.
In recent years, China has utilized the Belt and Road Initiative to actively draw in India’s neighboring countries to provoke and widen the conflicts amongst them. Although the said delegation repeatedly emphasized that it was not targeting a third party, by visiting the three countries in South Asia and signed various military agreements, China was explicitly and implicitly targeting India. As a matter of fact, there has been an on-going tension at the Sino-Indian border. In addition to increasing the number of troops at the border by 10,000, the Indian army has also opened the Sela Tunnel, which enables the Indian army to transport personnel and supplies from Bomdila to the troops stationed in Tawang (South Tibet as claimed by China.)
In November 2023, Mohamed Muizzu was elected President of the Maldives, and upon assuming office, he requested India to withdraw its to 89 military personnel from the country (the first 25 Indian troops were withdrawn on March 15, and the remaining are expected to be withdrawn by May 10.) And as a result of this withdrawal, India immediately plans to establish a new naval base in the Lakshadweep archipelago (on an island of 32 square kilometers in size, about 130 km north of Maldives, and 220 km off the Indian coast) to carry out surveillance missions against the country. From January 8 to 10, 2024, instead of following the usual practice of visiting India first, Muizzu visited China, during which both countries signed an action plan for a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership that covers more than 20 agreements in areas such as the economy, health, infrastructure, and housing, indicating a stalemate in Maldives-India relations. In the recent cabinet reshuffle in Nepal, the pro-India parties have lost control of the cabinet, making Nepal now one of the South Asia countries that China is actively pursuing.
In recent years, Chinese submarines have frequently sailed in the Indian Ocean and utilized Sri Lanka’s Port of Colombo for replenishment. In addition, Chinese research vessels frequently operate in the Indian Ocean to conduct hydro-meteorological observation, marine sediment collection, biochemical, atmospheric aerosol and undersea seismic collection surveys, in order to grasp its underwater geographic features, such as ocean currents, reefs, and trenches, and to draw large-scale underwater nautical charts. The scientific research information of the Indian Ocean is relevant to the safety of Chinese naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. Since January 2024, Sri Lanka has suspended the permission for foreign research vessels to conduct research activities in its waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for one year, which is not conducive to the China’s seabed research of the area. It is therefore highly likely that the delegation visited to negotiate a solution.
On December 26, 2023, China and Myanmar signed an agreement in which Myanmar agreed to lease Kyaukphyu Port (a deep-water port) to China for 99 years, becoming one of the ports for the Chinese navy to access the Indian Ocean. It is likely that the PLA will combine the rail and road systems it has built in Myanmar to support transportation, thus making Kyaukphyu Port the third overseas base, after Djibouti and Ream. According to the latest research report of the US-based Aid Data, the eight locations where China is likely to build overseas naval bases in the next two to five years include, in addition to Ream in Cambodia, are Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Bata in Equatorial Guinea, Gwadar in Pakistan, Kribi in Cameroon, Luganville in Vannadu, Nacala in Mozambique, and Nouakchott in Mauritania. The fact that four of the eight bases are in Africa highlights the importance of the Atlantic Ocean, meaning that the PLA Navy will be oriented towards a three-ocean strategy (Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and Atlantic Ocean). As the comprehensive strength of the PLA Navy increases, and to implement the strategy of “Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection”, the establishment of overseas bases will move from paper to reality.
Geographically, Nepal is in the north of India, Sri Lanka is in the southeast, and Maldives is in the south. China has formed a semi-encirclement of India by establishing close defense cooperation with these three countries. In other words, China’s deepening military cooperation with India’s neighboring countries not only challenges India’s control of the Indian Ocean, but also challenges the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. As such, is China gradually changing its past pattern of maintaining a symbolic military presence in the Indian Ocean, and gradually establishing a stronghold or overseas bases in the region as a strategic support for its projection of military power? In short, it is worthwhile to continue to pay attention to and study the aftermath of the successive visits of the Chinese military delegation to the three South Asian countries.
（Yang Tai-yuan, Contract Research Fellow, Institute of Chinese Communist Studies）
（Translated to English by Chen Cheng-Yi）
