The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) of China was held from January 8 to 10 in Beijing. It was mainly to review the disciplinary and supervisory work of 2023, outline significant plans for 2024, and examine the work report titled "Thoroughly Study and Implement General Secretary Xi Jinping's Important Thoughts on the Party's Self-Revolution, Deeply Advance High-Quality Development of Disciplinary and Supervisory Work in the New Journey" presented by Li Xi, secretary of the CDIC. Leaders of party and state all attended the meeting, including the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee.
This session emphasized that this year (2024) marks the 75th anniversary of state founding, and it needs to severely punish corruption involving collusion between politics and business as a top priority in the anti-corruption campaign. It specifically asked for "serious investigation and deep rectification" for corruption problems in the areas of finance, state enterprises, energy, infrastructure projects, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, food purchase and sales, higher education institutions, sports, and statistics. Efforts must be made to complete a joint disciplinary mechanism against key bribers, continue pushing on anti-corruption legislation, enforce special rectification on violations of rules on feasting, highlight political positioning with focus on inspection and supervision, improve the organization and staffing of disciplinary and supervisory agencies, deepen reform in dispatched agencies, and formulate “Opinions on Strengthening Joint Review and Investigation by Disciplinary and Supervisory Units of Central Universities and Local Disciplinary and Supervisory Commissions, ” guide the disciplinary and supervisory committees in various provinces, regions, and cities to start pilot projects of posting disciplinary and supervisory teams to provincial universities and state enterprises to “resolutely eliminate systematic corruption risks and hidden dangers.”
However, the corruptions involving political and business collusion go beyond the items specifically pointed by the CDIC. In further observation, the pointed industries belong to the sector of commercial business in nature, involving in substantial profits, which is understandable. But it becomes intriguing when areas like the universities, sports and statistics are highlighted.
Looking into the anti-corruption status disclosed by the CDIC and the National Supervisory Commission in its website last year, nearly 30 education officials at the department or bureau level from universities were investigated, including 17 party secretaries and presidents of universities. These corruption cases are mostly concerned with school project procurement, employment selection and appointment, enrollment exams, research funding, and school-owned enterprises. The involved schools of higher education mainly belong to central departments such as the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Transport, and provincial universities. It reflects the long-neglected issue of privilege and profit in the higher education system.
In the sports sector, take the worst case involving Chinese Football Association for example, it originated from match fixing and manipulation of games through betting and crimes like bribing opponents to play fake games. Almost all the leadership of China’s football organizations were implicated. Similar situation happened in billiard games, while a prominent retired head coach of women’s basketball was dispelled from the party and prosecuted for accepting huge bribery, intervening in the approval for basketball league participation rights, and embezzlement of public funds through her position. These cases further break the trust of the people to the “party-state.”
In 2016, the then-director of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) was taken into "coercive measures" for taking bribery and seeking profits for relatives. Recently, the statistical department again has become a focus in the anti-corruption campaign. The concrete case is not exposed yet, but it is speculated that it inevitably involves in accepting bribery and fabricating statistical data by related officials. It might have profound impact in various sectors relying on statistical data such as banking, trade, finance, scientific research and governance. It is one thing that Beijing often conceals real data, but it is another matter that the false information could lead to wrong decisions. This case may have broader implications and pose a significant challenge to China.
However, after a large-scale corruption scandal erupted inside the PLA Rocket Force, the CDIC surprisingly didn’t include the national defense or military industry as anti-corruption targets, presenting a subtle situation. Judging from the step down of China’s defense minister and a few high-ranking officers related to the Rocket Force, there is a wide and long existing corruption issue in the PLA. Reports from foreign media about missile flooding and ineffective operation of launch wells in the Rocket Force might have some credibility. The PLA Daily published a commentary titled “Reflecting Strict Discipline and Deep Love Through Daily Education Reminders to Officers and Men” during the CDIC’s plenary session. It claimed that the anti-corruption campaign has won overwhelming victory in the military, trying to calm external discussions about the corruption of the military. The CDIC intentionally excludes the military from key anti-corruption targets not because of the military’s overwhelming victory against corruption but meant to preserve the morale and image the party and the military.
In summary, since Xi Jinping came to power, more that 4.6 million officers have been under investigation, including 200,000 leaders at various levels. It was not the first time that Beijing declared anti-corruption commitment, but the results have got even worse with each effort, even involving in the officials of disciplinary and supervisory departments. The reason behind this recurring issue is that China has adopted a model of governance focusing on maximizing centralized power, under which officials are shielded by the party with unrestrained power, making corruption practice difficult to eradicate. The party seems to “lock power in the cage of the system” but it simply transfers power to another group of people. As China deepens its penetration and control over the society, this systematic and institutional corruption problems is hard to eradicate completely.
(Tzou Wen-Feng, Assistant Professor, Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defense University)
（Translated to English by Tracy Chou）
